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UNFAIR AND INACTIONABLE: THE CASE FOR A PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT ACTIVITY UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA’S UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW
MARK T. WILHELM*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
(UTPCPL)1 was originally passed in 1968, with a focus on protecting
Pennsylvania citizens from fraudulent and misleading commercial activity.2 In
1996, the UTPCPL was amended to include a private cause of action for
persons asserting a loss under the statute.3 Since that time, and in an effort to
protect consumers, Pennsylvania courts have applied the UTPCPL broadly to
encompass many commercial transactions.4 However, when examining the
application of the UTPCPL, it is clear that business and investment activities are
not within the scope of the UTPCPL’s private cause of action provision, even
when undertaken by relatively unsophisticated parties.5
This Essay will examine the current applicability of the UTPCPL to
business and investment practices in the context of predatory lending actions
related to business or investment properties.6 Further, it will present an
interpretation of the UTPCPL that may allow for a private cause of action for
improper business and investment transactions under the statute’s current
construction.
II. BUSINESS PURPOSE AND PREDATORY LENDING
The UTPCPL provides a private cause of action to persons affected by
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2012, University
of Michigan; Executive Editor, Vol. 60, Villanova Law Review.
1. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-1 to 201-9.3 (West 2014).
2. See id. § 201-3 (outlining unlawful acts under UTPCPL, which include “[u]nfair
methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”). Both “unfair methods of
competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” are defined at length in § 201-2(4).
See id. § 201-2(4); see also Romeo v. Pittsburgh Assocs., 787 A.2d 1027, 1033 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001); Seth William Goren, A Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance and Private Class
Actions Under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 107
DICK. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2002) (providing history of UTPCPL).
3. See Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law—Omnibus Amendments,
No. 1996-146, 1996 Pa. Legis. Serv. (West).
4. See Six v. Cole, 8 Pa. D. & C.4th 625, 627 (Ct. Com. Pl. Adams Cnty. 1991) (“The
purpose of the act has been stated as balancing bargaining positions of buyers with those of
sellers.”).
5. See Levine v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 2d 442, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(noting that availability of cause of action under UTPCPL “depends on the purpose of the
purchase, not the type of product purchased”).
6. Yet the interpretation advanced is equally applicable to any other business or
investment practice.

(25)
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various types of fraud or misrepresentation occurring as a part of a business
transaction.7 The parties able to assert this cause of action are limited to “[a]ny
person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family
or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or
property . . . .”8 Courts have routinely denied private causes of action under the
UTPCPL where plaintiffs, even in their capacity as individuals,9 have advanced
a UTPCPL claim in relation to a business or investment interest.10
In the context of the recent housing collapse, Pennsylvania citizens have
sought a private cause of action for acts that contributed to the collapse. Those
acts notably include predatory lending.11 While no Pennsylvania statute
explicitly gives rise to a cause of action for predatory lending, Pennsylvania
courts have recognized an action for predatory lending under the UTPCPL.12
Yet, those decisions have made it clear that the application of the UTPCPL to
predatory lending is limited only to acts that are associated with real estate used
for residential purposes.13

7. See 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2.
8. Id.
9. For the purposes of this Essay, the term “individual” is synonymous with “natural
person” unless otherwise stated.
10. See, e.g., Balderston v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 285 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir.
2002) (holding doctor’s purchase of medical device on behalf of patients was not personal, but
business related); Waldo v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 722, 725 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
(“The obvious intent of this language is to restrict claims brought under the CPL to those
which are legitimately of a consumer nature.”). The Waldo court did admit, however, that its
“research ha[d] uncovered no Pennsylvania case squarely on point,” and the court
consequently based its decision on precedent from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 726 (emphasis added). That is not to say that organizations
have never been able to bring a claim under the UTPCPL. See, e.g., Valley Forge Towers S.
Condo. v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, Inc., 574 A.2d 641, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (allowing
condominium association to assert private cause of action where transaction was for
residential use by individual unit owners). But see, e.g., Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist. v.
Hall-Kimbrell Envtl. Servs., Inc., 639 A.2d 1199, 1201–02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (declining to
recognize school district as representative of students for purposes of personal use analysis
under UTPCPL).
11. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:
The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (detailing
practices associated with predatory lending).
12. See Growall v. Maietta, 931 A.2d 667, 676 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (“There is no
question that the purchase or lease of a home, condominium, or apartment for residential
purposes comes under the protections of the UTPCPL.”); see also In re McConnell, 390 B.R.
170, 182 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“As an initial matter, the Court acknowledges that there is no
common law cause of action for ‘predatory lending.’ Any claim for relief for predatory
lending practices must be supported by some statutory basis . . . .”); Sovereign Bank v.
Gawron, 13 Pa. D. & C.5th 71, 79–80 (Ct. Com. Pl. Lackawanna Cnty. 2010) (reviewing
approaches to predatory lending causes of action inside and outside of Pennsylvania). Prior to
the Growall decision, there was some question regarding whether the UTPCPL in fact applied
to mortgages and associated loans. See generally John J. Jacko, III, Are Mortgage Loan
Transactions Really Subject to Private Actions Under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law?, 76 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 171 (2005) (questioning whether, preGrowall, UTPCPL applied to mortgage transactions and arguing that such transactions were
not actionable under then current interpretation of UTPCPL).
13. See Growall, 931 A.2d at 676; Lal v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 858 A.2d 119, 124–
25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (dismissing UTPCPL claim where plaintiff purchased real estate for
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By accepting the use of the UTPCPL for a private cause of action for
predatory lending—that relates to residential properties, but not for business or
investment properties—Pennsylvania courts have created a conflicting standard.
The UTPCPL is designed to protect relatively unsophisticated individuals from
unscrupulous business practices.14 But the UTPCPL inherently assumes that
these individuals will always be acting in their capacity as individuals.15 In the
non-individual context, Pennsylvania courts suggest that plaintiffs should rely
on common law causes of action to support their claims based in fraud or
breach of contract. But in the case of predatory lending, given the lack of a
common law cause of action, relatively unsophisticated businesses—including
individuals working in a business capacity or for investment purposes—are left
unprotected.16 Therefore, due to a lack of a common law remedy for predatory
lending practices, lenders are free to engage in these practices against
individuals and businesses alike that would be actionable under the UTPCPL
but for the business or investment purpose behind the transaction.17
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE DEFINITION OF “PERSONAL”
Persons, broadly defined, may find some recourse under the UTPCPL by
employing a critical reading of the statute’s text. The UTPCPL internally
defines person as “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships,
incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entities.”18
Yet, “personal” is not defined in the statute, despite being one of the main bases
for a private cause of action under the UTPCPL.19 The dictionary definition of
investment purposes merely because of investment nature of transaction). However, while
Growall applied the UTPCPL to residential property transactions with “no question,” the
court did not state whether the purchase of residential property was a personal purchase or a
household purchase for purposes of the private cause of action. See Growall, 931 A.2d at 676.
14. See Six v. Cole, 8 Pa. D. & C.4th 625, 627–28 (Ct. Com. Pl. Adams Cnty. 1991)
(“If consumer protection is the goal, one consumer should be as important as the next. It
would matter little to the individual customer whether he or she had been wronged by another
individual or a giant corporation.”).
15. In this way, the UTPCPL implicitly assumes that a natural person acting in a
business or investment related real estate transaction is in some way more sophisticated, better
protected, or more informed than the same person, under the same lending circumstances,
acting in the context of a residential real estate transaction.
16. In the context of predatory lending, this situation could arise in many mortgage
transactions, with examples including a single member limited liability company purchasing a
rental property or even a natural person purchasing an empty lot for the lot’s investment
potential. Given the underlying reasoning for declining to apply the UTPCPL to business and
investment activity—that these relatively sophisticated parties are already protected by their
own knowledge and bargaining power—application of the UTPCPL to such activity would
likely be limited to exclude parties that are seen as somehow more sophisticated and able to
protect themselves through their routine market actions.
17. Indeed, nearly all mortgage loan applications have at least one question regarding
whether the property will be used for residential or commercial purposes. While executing
other loan documents, borrowers are also routinely required to sign statements acknowledging
the same.
18. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-2(2) (West 2014).
19. Recall that a private cause of action is available for transactions entered into for
“personal, family or household purposes . . . .” See id. § 201-9.2 (emphasis added); see also
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“personal” is “[o]f or affecting a person.”20 Facially, this definition seems to
contemplate a natural person.
Given the broad definition of “person” in the UTPCPL, an argument may
be advanced that business activity falls within the scope of the private cause of
action, because the definition of “personal”—admittedly taken from the
dictionary, as opposed to the statute or case law—is something affecting the
person. Logically, any activity that affects the statutorily defined person falls
within the private cause of action. As such, a business entity—included within
the scope of person in the UTPCPL—acting in its regular course of business, is
necessarily engaged in activity that affects itself, the business. Because the
business is a person for purposes of the statute, that action of the business is
personal to the business since the action is of or affecting the business. That
business, therefore, should logically have a right to bring a claim under the
private cause of action provision under the “personal” clause.21
Understandably, Pennsylvania courts may be hesitant to adopt this
interpretation of the UTPCPL given its relative creativity.22 In fact, in a
substantively different context, this interpretation was litigated unsuccessfully
in a Pennsylvania trial court.23 However, courts admit that the scope of the
UTPCPL is intended to be interpreted broadly.24 Further, Pennsylvania courts
have explicitly stated that protecting consumers in real estate transactions, albeit
to date only in residential transactions, is an important interest contemplated by
the UTPCPL.25 This combination of intent to protect relatively unsophisticated
supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
21. In thirty states, statutes similar to the UTPCPL would allow a cause of action for a
business against another business relating to fraudulent or deceptive trade practices. See
Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are Saying Is Give Business a Chance: The
Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-Business Transactions, 57 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 60, 66–67 (2003).
22. Here, “creativity” refers to the novelty of the interpretation, especially in light of
many decisions—mostly in federal courts—that simply refuse to apply the UTPCPL to
business and investment activity, regardless of the identity or nature of the affected actor.
23. See Springboro Volunteer Fire Dep’t & Relief Ass’n v. J.C. Moore Indus. Sales
Corp., 50 Pa. D & C.3d 479, 482 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crawford Cnty. 1988) (declining to apply
UTPCPL under statutory construction argument to repair of fire truck). The Springboro court
reasoned that it did “not believe that repairs to a fire company’s fire truck [were] within
purview of the type of consumer purchases the legislature intended to protect.” Id. Notably,
the court did not address the logic of the underlying argument, but simply defaulted to its
interpretation of the legislature’s intent to exclude business purposes from the scope of the
UTPCPL. See id. at 482–83.
24. See Commonwealth ex rel. Creamer v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812,
815 n.5 (Pa. 1974) (“There is no indication of an intent to exclude a class or classes of
transactions from the ambit of the Consumer Protection Law. When the Legislature deemed it
necessary to make an exception from the Law’s scope, it did so in clear language.”);
Commonwealth ex. rel. Corbett v. Snyder, 977 A.2d 28, 44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (“The
CPL is to be liberally construed to effectuate the legislative goal of consumer protection.”);
Commonwealth v. Parisi, 873 A.2d 3, 9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (“[T]he Law is to be liberally
construed to effectuate the legislative goal of consumer protection.”); supra note 4 and
accompanying text. But see Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 93 A.3d 806, 815 (Pa.
2014) (holding “person” as defined in UTPCPL does not include political subdivision
agencies).
25. See Gabriel v. O’Hara, 534 A.2d 488, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (“Residential real
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consumers, as well as a viable interpretation of the UTPCPL, may provide a
limited exception to the prohibition against a private cause of action for
business or investment transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The above logic regarding the interpretation of “personal” may extend the
UTPCPL to all real estate transactions in which individuals are put at risk,
irrespective of the subjective motivations of the individuals.26 Especially in the
context of predatory lending, given the lack of an alternative cause of action,
individuals may be left without recourse if they are the victims of predatory
lending in a business or investment transaction. If the goal of the UTPCPL is
indeed to place buyers and sellers on equal ground—particularly in the context
of large real estate purchases—Pennsylvania courts must adopt a new, broad
reading of the UTPCPL to protect all consumers, without reviewing consumers’
subjective motives through a transaction-by-transaction analysis.

estate is almost always a consumer’s largest single purchase. Consequently, the impact of
unfair or deceptive practices is greatest in this type of transaction.”).
26. Of course, this interpretation applies to any application of the UTPCPL, including
applications for business or investment activity. However, given precedent, it is unlikely that
the UTPCPL would be applied to any business or investment transaction where a common law
or statutory cause of action has been recognized already.
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